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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we review Otmar Issing's career as the ECB's inaugural chief economist and we
document many notable successes. We try to infer some general principles that contributed to these
successes and draw some lessons. In doing so, we review the evidence using Woodford’s (2003)
recent revival of the Wicksellian approach to monetary policy making. Suitably interpreted the
baseline model can rationalize Issing’s three guiding principles for successful policymaking. This
baseline model, however, fails to account for the important role that monetary and financial analysis
played in the conduct of policy during Issing’s tenure. We propose an extension of the model to
account for financial developments and show that this extended model substantially improves our
understanding of ECB practice. We conclude by listing six open questions, relevant for the future
of central banking in Europe that Issing may want to consider in case leisure allows.
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“It is in the nature of beginning that something new is started which cannot be 
expected from what may have happened before. This character of startling 
unexpectedness is inherent in all beginnings.” 
 
Hannah Arendt, Human Condition, page 177-178. 
 
 
“Excellence, then is a state concerned with choice (...) being determined by the right 
rule and in the way in which the man of practical wisdom would determine it.” 
 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1106b36-1107a2. 
 
 
We review Otmar Issing’s service as the inaugural Chief Economist of the European 
Central Bank (ECB).  During his 8 years in the post he faced many unique challenges.  
Many of the hurdles associated with creating a new central bank and launching a new 
currency could have been anticipated, but some such as the terrorist attacks in 
September 2001 and the Asian Financial crisis in the Fall of 1998 (as the final 
preparations for the ECB were underway) could not have been foreseen. We study the 
choices that Issing and his colleagues made in confronting these challenges, the 
performance of monetary policy over the period and ask if there are any lessons that 
can be drawn from this episode. 
 
Early in his tenure Issing revealed his thinking on many of these matters.     
Specifically in 1999 he wrote:
1  
 
“As a central banker directly involved in monetary policy making, I have been dealing 
with uncertainty and its consequences for a large part of my professional life.(...) But 
never have I felt the impact of uncertainty as acutely as in the weeks that preceded the 
introduction of the euro and the birth of the single monetary policy.(...) when the 
Governing Council made its final announcement on the monetary policy strategy and 
was getting ready for the Changeover Weekend, the uncertainty was at its peak. 
Nothing could be taken for granted, no matter how careful the preparatory work had 
been.” 
 
Perhaps because of this awareness Issing designed a monetary policy framework that 
accounted for the uncertainties confronting the newly formed central bank.   In doing 
so, he faced at least six specific challenges. The first has to do with data uncertainty. 
Here we may distinguish two different aspects. The creation of the euro area, a new 
economic entity, introduced a discontinuity in existing statistical time series. 
Historical time series for the euro area exist only since 1999. In order to perform 
econometric analysis it is necessary to use synthetic aggregates, based on national 
data, before 1999. The other aspect to bear in mind relates to the fact that, at the start, 
the timeliness and scope of information was below the standard, normally available to 
the central bank of an industrialized country.  
 
                                                 
1 Otmar Issing, Monetary Policy of the ECB in a World of Uncertainty, Address to the ECB 
Conference Monetary Policy Making under Uncertainty, December 1999.   2
Secondly, the creation of the ECB and the start of the single monetary policy could be 
expected to induce a structural break a la Lucas (1976). Interestingly the available 
evidence suggests that, probably because of the gradual convergence process prior to 
monetary unification, no discontinuity took place.  
 
Thirdly, the introduction of the euro is a catalyst for structural change leading to 
deeper trade and financial integration. Changing patterns of integration, in turn, affect 
the linkages across euro area economies. Already in 1999, Wim Duisenberg, the first 
President of the ECB, underlined the importance of obtaining better knowledge about 
the structure and functioning of the euro area economy and, in particular, of the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. For policymakers this meant that they 
needed to account for both parameter uncertainty and model uncertainty.  
 
Fourth, the ECB as a new institution, had to start operating without the benefit from a 
track record. Blinder (1999), in his book, portrays central bankers as obsessed with 
credibility. There are excellent reasons for such obsession. When inflation 
expectations become unhinged, inflation dynamics become unstable with inflation 
literally feeding on itself. The experience of the Great Inflation testifies how 
economic performance is affected and how long it takes to re-establish price stability. 
 
Fifth, as stressed above, the creation of a new central bank, responsible for the 
conduct of monetary policy in a new economic entity the euro area is an event of 
historical magnitude, in the context of European integration. It is a major defining 
moment of constitutional relevance. Nevertheless, many issues of governance, 
political legitimacy and political accountability remain open, potentially affecting the 
position of central bank in the political realm. 
 
Finally, a source of immediate concern, in the early days of the ECB, related to some 
specific difficulties associated with the transition process. Obstfeld (1998) refers to 
both the fixing of the conversion rates of national currencies to euro and the start of 
operations of the European large value payment system (TARGET), an essential 
ingredient for a smooth transition to the new Eurosystem’s operational framework for 
the implementation of monetary policy. 
 
Against this backdrop, and the ECB’s mandate to deliver price stability, over the 
medium term, we evaluate the policy strategy that the ECB adopted. We argue that it 
has worked surprisingly smoothly and surprisingly well. Issing is at the root of this 
outstanding performance. This explains the quote from Aristotle in epigraph to this 
paper.  According to Aristotle, practical deliberation, meaning, for our purposes 
policy-making, can never be fully scientific. There must always be an element of art, 
associated with the ability to grasp the relevant particulars. Decisions are always made 
in concrete, individual, historical context. However, this is not the aspect we will want 
to highlight. Instead, we want to recall that also, according to Aristotle, the standard 
of excellence in decision-making is the man of practical wisdom. In other words, it is 
the successful policy-maker.  
 
Thus, according with Aristotle’s viewpoint, we ask, in this paper, whether the ECB’s 
success under Issing happened as predicted by a variant of the New Keynesian model 
(clearly derived and systematically explored in Woodford 2003).  We offer this model 
not because it necessarily characterizes Issing’s views of the structure of the economy   3
or the monetary transmission mechanism, but rather because it has become the 
workhorse model used in the academic literature studying monetary policy design. 
 
We find that ECB practice and the predictions of benchmark model depart most 
sharply regarding the importance of the financial system in the conduct of monetary 
policy. Most renditions of the traditional model abstract from any structural 
representation of the monetary and financial system and of the role of the financial 
system in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. We believe that this may 
prove a very important omission for our ability to understand the actual conduct of 
policy. In the spirit of Wicksell we distinguish between the policy rate and the loan 
rate (which is the relevant rate for determining spending decisions). We extend the 
standard model in a very simple way to take into account this additional complication.  
We argue that by doing so we can better understand actual ECB conduct.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 1 we present an overview of 
the single monetary policy after seven years. We stress the unique, historical changes, 
associated with the creation of the euro area and the starting up of the ECB. We go on 
to ask   
Has the stability-oriented monetary policy strategy worked?  
How did it work? 
Given the perspective taken in the paper it is clear that the answer to the first question 
will be yes.  
 
In section 2 we will discuss a model that includes some minimum conditions, which 
are necessary in order for monetary policy to be effective. The conditions we will be 
focusing on derive from the role of money as a unit of account. Specifically, we use a 
fundamental equation that appears in most models using a new Keynesian or New 
Neoclassical Synthesis approach to monetary policy making (these include 
Goodfriend and King, 1997, 2001, Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999, Svensson and 
Woodford, 2005 and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2005). In this class of 
models the fundamental friction comes from imperfect price adjustment associated 
with the mechanism of nominal price setting by monopolistic competitive firms. We 
focus on optimal policy as implied by the Woodford (2003) variant of the model, and 
relate the model’s policy prescriptions to those annunciated by Issing.  
 
In section 3 we will look at the transmission mechanism of monetary policy through 
the financial system, in general, and the banking system, in particular. Woodford’s 
model also spells the connection between policy rates and expenditure precisely.  In 
his basic set-up, there is a direct link between the policy rate and expenditure. 
However, going back to Wicksell there have been debates as to how to model the 
relevance of the financial system in the transmission of monetary policy.   Inspired by 
Wicksell we will minimally depart from the standard set-up and introduce a second 
interest rate that matters for spending. In deference to Wicksell will call this rate the 
“loan” rate.
2 Such extension allows us to consider important issues such as liquidity, 
financial stability and asset prices and their relevance for the conduct of monetary 
policy. 
                                                 
2 See Brainard (1964), Brunner and Meltzer (1972, 1993), Friedman (1970), Tobin (1969), Bernanke 
and Blinder (1988) and very recently Cecchetti and Li (2005)).   
   4
 
In section 4 we will conclude and list a number of open questions that men of 
practical wisdom (in particular Otmar Issing) may want to reflect upon. 
 
 
1.  Brief overview of the Single Monetary Policy 1999-2005. 
 
 
The questions we will examine in this section are:  
 
Has the stability-oriented monetary policy strategy worked?  
How did it work? 
 
The answer to the first question is clearly yes. The European Union Treaty and the 
statute of the ECB and the European System of Central Banks (EUT and the Statute) 
state that maintaining price stability is the primary goal of monetary policy. On 
October 13, 1998, the Governing Council adopted a precise, quantitative definition of 
price stability based on a specific statistical indicator: “Price stability shall be defined 
as year-on-year increase in the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), for the 
euro area of below 2 percent. (ECB (1998)).” The ECB’s aim was to maintain price 
stability over the medium term. On May 8, 2003, the Governing Council further 
clarified that it aimed at maintaining inflation below (but close to) 2 percent, over the 
medium term.
3  Table 1 and Chart 1 show that ECB has essentially attained this goal: 
the average annual increase, in the HICP, during the first seven years of the single 
monetary policy has been very close, but not below 2 per cent.  
 
The announcement of a precise, quantitative definition of price stability, based on a 
specific indicator fulfills three functions: by making the primary objective more 
visible and easier to understand it makes monetary policy more transparent and 
predictable. The definition also provides an objective yardstick against which the 
performance of the monetary authority may be measured. Thus, it helps 
accountability. Lastly, the definition, together with the medium term orientation, 
helps anchoring inflation expectations enhancing the credibility of policy. 
 
One fundamental characteristic of the ECB´s approach to maintaining price stability is 
its medium-term orientation (ECB (1999)). Apart from providing a long term anchor 
to expectations a medium-term orientation also allows, after a shock, for a gradual 
approach in returning to price stability. Such a gradual approach may be called for in 
order to avoid unnecessary volatility in economic activity and interest rates. An 
important qualification follows from the fact that the ECB has always emphasized that 
the relevant time horizon is not constant. It depends on the current state, the nature 
and characteristics of the shocks and on the functioning of the economy. Moreover, a 
medium term orientation also acknowledges the importance of long and variable lags 
of monetary transmission, avoiding the dangers of short-sighted activism. In other 
words the uncertainties associated with the timing and magnitude of monetary policy 
actions is too great to allow for fine-tuning of short term developments in the price 
level. 
 
                                                 
3 See ECB(2003a, 2003b) and Issing et al (2003) for more details.    5
The remark above that inflation was, in the period 1999-2005, close (but not below) 2 
percent is an example of an ex post evaluation of the performance of policy. The small 
deviation is easily accounted for given the accumulation of a long list of 
miscellaneous shocks to the price level (e.g. oil prices and other commodity prices, 
food prices, administered prices and indirect taxes). Examining Chart 1 it becomes 
clear that the ECB has also been successful in keeping price stability, in the more 
imprecise sense of maintaining inflation low and stable. Moreover, given the medium 
term orientation the differences between the various indicators included in the Chart 
are immaterial. 
 
Insert Chart 1 about here 
 
 
Table 1: Price Stability and overall Macroeconomic Stability. 
 
Euro  Area    US     
1990-1998 1999-2005 1990-1998 1999-2005 
Average StDev Average StDev Average StDev Average StDev
HICP/CPI 12th month % change  2,81 1,07 2,01 0,46 3,10  1,14  2,53 0,71
Real GDP quarterly % change  0,48 0,52 0,46 0,36 0,76  0,53  0,71 0,53
Real Consumption quarterly %  change 0,48 0,58 0,43 0,40 0,78  0,51  0,87 0,41
Employment quarterly % change  0,12 0,34 0,28 0,24 0,32  0,35  0,26 0,44
Unemployment rate  9,80 0,99 8,55 0,47 5,93  0,97  5,05 0,79
Long-term interest rates  8,23 1,98 4,60 0,64 6,78  1,04  4,86 0,82
Short-term interest rates  7,62 2,80 3,13 0,96 4,88  1,29  2,95 1,79
 
Source: Masuch (2005) 
 
As already noted the Governing Council definition of price stability is not only a 
benchmark for ex post accountability but also an anchor for inflation expectations. 
The latter aspect is closely linked to credibility. Thus, in the second place, we must 
examine the ECB’s performance in terms of credibility. Chart 2 plots two such 
measures the five-year ahead inflation forecast, from the ECB’s Survey of 
Professional Forecasters and the 10-year break-even inflation rate recovered from the 
10-year index linked bond.
4  From the Chart it is clear that expectations have been 
stable and consistently close to the ECB’s definition of price stability (please notice 
the scale on the vertical axis). Castelnuovo and others (2003) and Gaspar (2003) have 
shown that there is a very low correlation between short run forecasts (or changes in 
short run forecasts), which are much more volatile, and long run forecasts (or changes 
thereof). 
 
Insert Chart 2 about here 
 
At the same time it is clear from Table 1 (which is taken from Masuch, 2005) that the 
stability of inflation and inflation expectations has coincided with low volatility of 
important real variables like GDP and employment. Low volatility compared with the 
recent past (but also longer time periods, see Masuch, 2005) and also with the US – 
                                                 
4 Computed on the basis of bonds, issued by the French treasury, indexed to the euro area HICP, 
maturing in 2012. The break even inflation rate is computed by equating the yield to maturity on the 
real bond to the nominal bond with the same maturity.   6
where volatility was also fallen recently. The drop in volatility is particularly marked 
for financial variables like long term interest rates.  
 
It is worthwhile to pause to consider the facts. Clearly it is not possible to conclude 
from comparing volatilities that monetary policy has caused such improvement.
5 
However, in the literature following Rogoff’s (1985) contribution, it was expected 
that delegation of monetary policy to an independent (conservative) central bank 
would lead to lower inflation on average and to higher volatility of output. Alesina 
and Summers (1993) looked at this proposition using a sample of OECD countries. 
They found that central bank independence was, as expected associated with lower 
average inflation, but also that the variance of growth or employment were not related 
to central bank independence. In such perspective the experience of the ECB adds to 
the evidence pointing to the compatibility between price stability and overall 
macroeconomic stability. We will comment on this further below. 
 
How has it worked? 
 
In the Eurosystem, as in all modern central banks, monetary policy operates first 
through a short tem interest rate. The central bank offers two standing facilities: a 
lending and a deposit facility. The two standing facilities define a corridor limiting the 
fluctuation in the overnight rate. Moreover, the ECB steers market interest rates 
though its regular main refinancing operations. If we look at Chart 3 the first few 
weeks of 1999 – the start of the single monetary policy - do not stand out. It shows 
that banks adapted quickly and easily to the new environment. The evidence suggests 
that the precautions taken by the Governing Council, on 22 December 1998, in 
particular the narrow corridor (of just 50 basis points) defined by the marginal lending 
facility and the deposit facility, effectively contained money market volatility. After a 
few teething problems in the first few days the situation rapidly stabilized so that 
already on 21 January 1999 the ECB was able to announce the normalization of the 
corridor width effective from the following day onwards. The start of the 
Eurosystem’s operational framework and of the TARGET system occurred in a 
seamless way (calming the concerns referred to in the Introduction).
6 
 
Insert Chart 3 about here 
 
To sum up: after seven years the balance of the single monetary policy is impressive: 
 
-  The transition to the single monetary policy has been seamless. 
-  Price stability over the medium term has been maintained. 
-  Inflation expectations have been low, stable and (by and large) compatible 
with the ECB’s definition of price stability. 
-  Volatility of macroeconomic variables has declined. 
-  Volatility of long term bond yields has declined as well. 
 
                                                 
5 However, see Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and Krause (2006) for some evidence that monetary policy 
might be responsible. 
6 See Gaspar, Perez-Quirós and Sicilia (2001) for more detailed documentation on the operational 
transition to the single monetary policy.   7
In our view much of this success is attributable to the monetary policy strategy that 
Issing helped design.  Issing (Issing et al, 2005, pp 75-76) summarizes the policy and 
strategy that emerged as follows: 
 
“As  in the Bundesbank's case, the ECB's approach involves both rule like 
features, consistent with the results of monetary theory,  and an  attention to central 
banking experience in the implementation phase.  The key messages from monetary 
policy theory which emerge through the lens of my professional experience can be 
stated as follows: 
 
       - don’t try tricks, don’t try to be too clever; 
       - keep  steady,  keep  committed  to  your  mandate  even in exceptional       
circumstances; 
       - say  as  much  as  you  can  of  what  you are going to do: announce a 
strategy; 
       - don’t  be dogmatic,  but follow a policy which is always in line with 
your strategy.” 
 
He concludes by announcing three principles for successful conduct of monetary 
policy. 
 
 1)  Institutions matter. Central bank independence and a mandate for price 
stability are crucial pre-requisites for successful central banking: “Sound institutional 
arrangements play a central role.  Historical evidence and theory agree in pointing out 
that central bank independence and a clear mandate  for  price stability  are  the basic 
elements of a sound institutional set-up.”  
 
 2)  Credibility is paramount: “They provide the premises to establish 
credibility,  to anchor inflationary  expectations and  ultimately deliver  price  stability 
and foster a stable macroeconomic environment.”   
 
 3)  Temptation must be resisted. Moral responsibility and fortitude are 
fundamental in the face of economic complexity and change: “We must never forget 
this message, nor ever take credibility for granted, even at times when price stability 
is established and there seem to be minor  challenges ahead.   Credibility is  hard  to 
gain, but it is easily lost.  To be maintained, it requires continuous vigilance.  If lost, it 
can be regained only at high costs to society.”   
 
The ECB´s monetary policy embodies these three principles.  The ECB’s mandate and 
independence are enshrined in the European Union Treaty and in its Statute. Thus, 
they have a constitutional character in Europe. Moreover, the strategy is medium term 
oriented, forward-looking and based on a full information approach. Its assessment of 
the current economic situation and risks to price stability is based on two 
complementary viewpoints: economic analysis and monetary analysis.  Furthermore, 
the communication strategy of the ECB is organized around explaining interest rate 
decisions in terms of how they relate to the price stability mandate.
7  
 
                                                 
7 An important part of the communication strategy has also to provide regular updates on the ECB’s 
experience and what the experience implied for the monetary policy strategy.  See Issing (1999b, 2000, 
2001c, and 2005).     8
In this section we will not comment further on specific decisions and their 
circumstances. We will look at some examples in the following sections. 
 
However, before moving on, it is important to note that during this period many 
important events took place at the European level. A partial list includes the 
disappointing pace of structural reforms in many Member States and in the EU as a 
whole, as is clear from the European Commission own review of the Lisbon strategy, 
the debate over budgetary discipline and the Stability and Growth Pact (culminating 
with the ruling of the European Court of Justice and the revision of some secondary 
legislation), the enlargement of the European Union to include ten new Member 
States and the rejection of the European Constitution in referenda by French and 
Dutch voters. 
 
Issing (1995) wrote: 
 
“In view of European integration, the role and responsibilities of the central bank are 
assuming international and supranational dimensions to an unprecedented extent. 
Since nothing less than the future constitution of the Community is at stake in this 
integration process, the position of the future European central bank within the overall 
pattern of the “political union” is not the least of issues that have to be considered and 
decided.” 
 
And in (2001a) he wrote a paper where he started, as an economist by posing the 
question: Can One Size Fit All? And ended with his passionate answer that as an 
European citizen “At this juncture monetary union simply cannot fail. It must 
succeed: One size must fit all.” 
 
The first question we address to Otmar Issing is:  
 
Monetary union is a major institutional change that will necessarily lead to important 
behavioral changes, which cannot be accurately foreseen. At the same time, proper 
functioning of the monetary union also calls for institutions to change, for structural 
reform.  
 
Given the fact the monetary, economic and political trends are co-determined and co-
evolutionary what is the ground for optimism about the future of the European Union?  
How will political forces affect the operation of the European Central Bank and the 
Eurosystem? 
   9
 
2.  Economic Analysis: Maintaining Price Stability and Anchoring Inflation 
Expectations. 
 
“If it were in our power to regulate completely the price system of the future, the ideal 
position ... would undoubtedly be one in which, without interfering with the inevitable 
variations in the relative prices of commodities, the general level of prices ... would 
be perfectly invariant and stable. And why should not such regulation lie within the 
scope of practical politics? ... Absolute prices ... are a matter in the last analysis of 
pure convention, depending on the choice of a standard of price which lies within our 
power to make.” 
 
Knut Wicksell, Interest and Prices, page 4.
8 
 
In this section, we follow the approach proposed by Aristotle and ask whether the 
successes that have just been documented accord with the predictions of the kind of 
model that has become the standard in the academic literature that studies optimal 
monetary policy decision-making.  We focus on specifically on the fundamental 
equation that appears in most models using a new Keynesian or New Neoclassical 
Synthesis approach to monetary policy making (these include, among others, 
Goodfriend and King, 1997, 2001, Walsh, 1998, Goodfriend, 2002 and Svensson and 
Woodford, 2005).   Our analysis draws most heavily on the variant of this model 
studied by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) and by Woodford (2003). 
 
This model rests on several critical assumptions. First, it presumes that the goods 
market is populated with a set of monopolistically competitive firms as in Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977).  Second, this imperfect competition means that firms must set prices. 
As in Calvo (1983), firms commit to a fixed nominal price in advance of knowing the 
demand for that period.  At the end of each period a fraction of the firms are allowed 
to adjust their price freely, while the remaining firms increase theirs’ based on the 
inflation rate observed in the period.  This so-called partial indexation assumption is 
made so that the model’s predicted persistence in inflation will match that found in 
the data. We also will explore the implications of dropping the indexation. Third, 
firms produce using labor under a marginal diminishing returns technology. Fourth, 
output is demand determined at the set price.  
 
Finally, the model allows for shocks that create a tension between price stability and 
output gap stabilization. For example, in the case of a positive “cost-push” shock 
inflation rises and output falls relative to its natural level. 
 
Inflation in this framework is inefficient because firms have promised to meet demand 
at their fixed nominal price.  Consequently aggregate inflation moves real, relative 
prices (which is inefficient).  We consider model’s presumption of nominal price 
rigidity as appropriate since absent some sort of price stickiness monetary policy will 
be neutral; if prices can all adjust proportionally following a change in the quantity of 
                                                 
8 Quoted in Michael Woodford’s Interest and Prices, page 1.    10
money then no real quantities (including most importantly the real interest rate) will 
be affected by monetary policy.
9     
 
One of Issing’s contributions to this debate was to promote basic research on these 
issues and in this case the Eurosystem Inflation Persistence Network produced a 
wealth of information on price setting and inflation dynamics. A very short summary 
of findings from micro data sets is that prices do change infrequently (only about 15 
percent of consumer prices change each month). Thus, price stickiness is clearly 
documented. When prices do change, they can either increase or decrease. In euro 
area data, 60 percent of the prices changing are increases, while 40 percent are 
declines. Price changes are sizeable (on average 8 per cent for price increases and 10 
per cent for price decreases). There is no evidence of mechanical indexation to past 
inflation, undermining the micro-foundations, for the inclusion of lagged inflation, in 
the New Keynesian Phillips curve. Price reviews are more frequent than price 
changes, which calls into question the rational inattention version of the sticky 
information story (for additional elaboration and complete references see Angeloni et 
al, 2004, Issing (2004), Fabiani et al., 2005 and Alvarez et al., 2005). In any case, for 
the remainder of this paper we will follow the dominant trend in the literature to stick 
to the Calvo price-setting assumption. 
 
Woodford (2003) shows that under rational expectations, these standard assumptions 
lead to a Phillips curve of the form 
(1)  () t t t t t t t u x + + − Ε = − + − κ γπ π β γπ π 1 1 , 
where π is inflation, x is the output gap, β is the discount rate, κ is a convolution of 
the structural parameters, γ is the degree of indexation of prices, not optimally set 
each period, and u is a cost-push shock (assumed i.i.d.). Thus, in equation (1) inflation 
is determined by lagged inflation, inflation expectations, the output gap and the shock.  
In this section, we will simply assume that the central bank directly controls the 
output gap, thereby abstracting from the complexities of the monetary transmission 
mechanism.
10 The assumption does not affect the main results we will present. We 
postpone the discussion of the importance of the monetary transmission mechanism to 
section 3. 
Furthermore, up to a second order approximation, the (negative of the) period social 
welfare function (as also shown in Woodford, 2003) takes the form 
 (2) 
2 2
1) ( t t t t x L λ γπ π + − = −  , 
where λ is another function of the underlying structural parameters. 
 
The problem of minimizing the loss function in equation (2) subject to the linear 
constraint (1), given by the New Keynesian Phillips curve resembles the classic linear 
quadratic framework explored in the 1950s by Simon (1956) and Theil (1954, 1957). 
Simon and Theil extended the deterministic framework of Tinbergen (1952) to a 
                                                 
9  We are less convinced that the Calvo formulation of the rigidity is necessarily appropriate and are 
intrigued by the recent papers such as Klenow and Kyvstov (2005), Golosov and Lucas (2005) and 
Gertler and Leahy (2006) that explore competing formulations. 
10 Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) explain the approach we follow, by appealing to a division of the 
optimal policy problem in two stages. In the first stage, the one we will focus on, the optimal path of 
inflation and the output gap are determined. In the second stage, the policy rate path, compatible with 
the optimal solution, determined in stage one, is worked out using a forward-looking IS curve.   11
stochastic set-up and showed that, in the linear-quadratic framework, both certainty 
equivalence and the separation of estimation and control held true. The main 
difference of our problem relative to the classical policy instrument choice framework 
is that expectations about the future are endogenous and influence the current state of 
the economy. Recently, Svensson and Woodford (2003) have identified conditions for 
these results to hold in models with forward-looking behavior. 
 
The first order conditions for the central banker's problem may be shown to imply: 
 




= .                                                                                              
Under the optimal discretionary policy, the output gap only responds to the current 
cost-push shock. In particular, following a positive cost-push shock to inflation, 
monetary policy is tightened and the output gap falls. The strength of the response 
depends on the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve, κ, and the weight on 
output gap stabilization in the loss function, λ. The reaction function in (3) contrasts 
with the one derived in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999). They assume that the loss 
function is quadratic in inflation (instead of the quasi-difference of inflation) and they 
find that, in such a case, the output gap is also a function of lagged inflation. 
The corresponding equation for inflation as a function of the shock is: 





+ = .         
Equation (4) makes it clear that under partial indexation inflation will respond 
gradually and persistently to a temporary cost push shock. Inflation persistence 
contrasts here with a non-persistent response of the output gap to cost-push shocks 
(assumed to be i.i.d.).                                                                                                      
Expressing inflation directly as a function of the output gap: 





γπ π = = .       
 
The solution under commitment is considerably different. Specifically, the expression 
relating the output gap and inflation becomes
11: 
                                      
(6)          () 1 - t t t t - - x x γπ π
λ
κ
= − −1                                                          
 
What general principles for the conduct of monetary can we extract from this set-up? 
What questions remain for a wise policy-maker? 
 
First, all models incorporating the type of nominal rigidity that we have discussed 
imply a strong case for price stability. The idea, which does not seem to depend on the 
details of the modeling strategy, is that the allocative inefficiency, associated with 
                                                 
11 The first order condition relative to the first period would be different. We disregard such peculiarity 
assuming that the optimization was performed a long time in the past. This is the idea of Woodford’s 
timeless perspective.   12
relative price dispersion will, in general, be eliminated by the stability of the 
aggregate price level (assuming γ<1). The way to achieve such an outcome is to 
follow a monetary policy regime where firms, when setting prices, will have no desire 
to change them. Such decisions, in turn, will validate the firms’ initial expectations. In 
the absence of cost-push shocks the intuition behind this principle is clear. As 
Goodfriend and King (1997, 2001) stress nominal price stickiness is the only 
distortion preventing the identity between the rational expectations equilibrium and 
the first best allocation of resources. Thus, optimal monetary policy aims at 
reproducing the allocation of resources which would occur under flexible price 
equilibrium. Thus, the model clearly accords with Issing’s first principle that 
emphasizes the primacy of a price-stability mandate and the wisdom of delegating 
such mandate to an independent central bank.  
 
Second, it is apparent directly from equation (1) that policy credibility will also be 
important.   In particular, given a positive cost push shock, the central bank is faced 
with a dilemma because the output gap will drop and inflation will rise.  However, the 
tension depends importantly on what happens to expected inflation.  If the public 
believes that the expected inflation will be lower following the temporary increase in 
inflation, the policymaker’s problem is made less acute. Conversely, if the public 
foresees higher expected inflation it magnifies the shock making the policy dilemma 
worse.  This observation rationalizes Issing’s second principle that stresses the 
importance of credibility.   
 
Issing’s third principle focuses on the risks associated with caving in to the temptation 
to accommodate a shock and associated problems once inflation expectations become 
unhinged.  The preceding discussion suggests that this is clearly possible.  The 
importance of this consideration appears to center on the nature of the shocks that the 
policymaker must confront.  The discussion in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) is 
particularly illuminating on this point. They show that optimal policy calls for 
offsetting demand shocks and for accommodating shocks to potential output. In all 
such circumstances stabilizing prices ensures stability of the output gap (or 
alternatively the mark up). In such circumstances, Goodfriend and King (2001), 
explain that policy aiming at price stability is neutral policy precisely because it 
maintains output close to its potential.
12  In all such circumstances there are no trade-
offs. So in these specifications only cost-push shocks create a dilemma for the central 
bank.  Offsetting all other shocks is optimal so that only an incompetent central bank 
would fail to do so.    
So what exactly are these cost push shocks?  Woodford (2003) shows that, in the 
context of the current class of models, it is possible to ground cost-push disturbances 
                                                 
12 The model of Goodfriend and King is within the tradition of optimal taxation in general equilibrium, 
in the spirit of Ramsey (1927) and Lucas and Stokey (1983). The basic intuition follows from looking 
at the wedge between price and the marginal cost – the mark-up – as analogous to a tax rate. Constant 
mark-ups are optimal (or approximately optimal) in a way which is analogous to tax smoothing over 
the business cycle or uniform taxation in the optimal taxation literature. As in the optimal taxation 
literature there may be departures from optimality of constant mark-ups and price stability but they 
argue departures are likely to be minor and temporary. In their setting preserving price stability keeps 
output at potential.   
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on time-varying tax wedges or mark-ups.
13  Alternatively, Benigno and Woodford 
(2004) show that in an extended model with other distortions, output will normally be 
below its efficient level so that other factors, such as exogenous government spending 
shocks also change the gap between the flexible price level of output and the efficient 
level of output varies over time. Thus, these disturbances introduce a trade-off 
between inflation volatility and output gap volatility.  
 
Finally, in a recent paper Blanchard and Gali (2005) argue that the introduction of real 
frictions, in the model, creates an environment where the gap between the natural 
level of output and the efficient level of output fluctuates endogenously in response to 
economic shocks.  Blanchard and Gali argue that real wage rigidity is more than an 
example of a real friction. It is their belief that real wage rigidities rank high in their 
ability to contribute to the empirical explanation of the business cycle. The model is 
also able to account for some empirical facts about inflation, namely its strong 
dependence on lagged inflation.  
 
Taken together it seems that either using the baseline model sketched above, or more 
complicated variants involving more frictions, there will be a wide range of shocks 
that may create a temptation for the central bank.  The possibility of yielding to 
temptation directly threatens credibility. As equation (3) shows optimal discretionary 
policy involves just a linear response to the cost-push shock. This implies that the 
output gap is not persistent (under the assumption of i.i.d. shocks) and inflation is 
persistent. Such policy is not globally optimal. Indeed, as Woodford (2003) shows, 
commitment to a history-dependent policy allows for the simultaneous reduction in 
the volatility of inflation and of the output gap. The ability to commit – that is 
credibility – is associated with welfare gains.  
 
What explains this result? The key aspect is forward-looking behavior on the part of 
price setters. As Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003) show, a 
central bank will want to commit to pursue a policy of sustaining its response to cost-
push shocks so that the policy persists well after the shock has vanished from the 
economy. Specifically, a positive cost-push shock should be followed by a 
persistently negative output gap (and vice-versa). Such response is optimal because it 
generates expectations of a reduction in the price level that reduce the immediate 
impact of the shock, spreading it over time. With optimal policy, under commitment, 
inflation expectations operate as automatic stabilizers in the face of cost-push shocks. 
This stabilizing effect explains why it is possible to improve the inflation volatility, 
output gap volatility trade-off and why caving in to the temptation to combat these 
shocks would be misguided. Thus, it seems that simple extensions of the benchmark 
model account well for Issing’s three key principles.   
 
We are not sure Issing would agree.  In Issing et al (2005), Issing recommends 
“skepticism in the application of theoretical results on how to optimally balance short 
term trade-offs and the belief that, once the benefits of medium and long-run price 
stability have been attained, the additional gains produced by such “optimized” 
policies are “small”, and often model-dependent.” Our second question to Otmar 
Issing, is thus: as a practical matter what are the most likely threats to the credibility 
                                                 
13 The approach in Woodford (2003) is very common in the literature. See, for example, Clarida, Gali 
and Gertler (2001), Smets and Wouters (2003) and Steinsson (2003).   14
of the European Central Bank? Which temptations are hardest to resist, what mistakes 
easiest to make? How important is communication with the European people as 
prevention against such possibilities? 
 
We close this section by noting one further implication of the role of expectations as 
potential automatic stabilizers. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003), 
show that the price level is stationary for the case of optimal policy under 
commitment (taking the timeless perspective). Under commitment and without partial 











Woodford (2003) shows that the price level is stationary even allowing for partial 
indexation (provided γ<1). In addition, Vestin (2006) shows that, for the case γ=0, it 
is possible to implement fully optimal policy through the delegation of a target for the 
path of the price level to the central bank. Clearly, in such a case, it is possible to 
improve on the discretionary inflation targeting case by entrusting a price path target 
to the central bank. Inflation volatility and output gap volatility can be reduced. 
Therefore, even in the case of a society that cares only about inflation and output gap 
stability, it might still be beneficial to entrust the central bank with a price level 
mandate. This is just one example of a modified loss function (as in Rogoff (1985) or 
Walsh (1995)). 
  
The main alternative to sticky price is sticky information models, which, recently 
have been formulated on the basis of behavioral models.
14 Interestingly the 
conclusions for policy are very similar to those summarized above. Ball, Mankiw and 
Reis (2003) show that optimal policy stabilizes the path for the price level in response 
to productivity and demand shocks. In case shocks to mark-up levels are added the 
optimal response becomes, as before, flexible targeting of the price level. 
 
Before putting forward our third question to Issing it is necessary to take a step back 
and look at the role of money as a unit of account. Robert Shiller (1997) illustrates the 
important role of money as a unit of account in long-dated financial contracts. The 
absence of indexation clauses in most contracts is a puzzle given the magnitude of 
long term inflation risk in historical time series. The relevance is clear when thinking 
about buying real estate or planning for retirement. From such a viewpoint price level 
stability appears important in its own right. These important aspects of the role of 
money as a unit of account are not present in the theoretical frameworks we have 
presented in this Section. Moreover, as Coulombe (1997) was among the first to point 
out, price level targets help to alleviate the zero lower bound on interest rates 
constraint on monetary policy. The reason is that they are consistent with increasing 
inflation expectations in the face of deflation shocks.
15 Lastly, it seems from the 
implications of the current vintage of sticky prices and sticky information models, that 
we have considered here, that a focus on price level stability would lead to even better 
outcomes in terms of inflation and output gap variability. In such context, focusing on 
                                                 
14 See Blanchard (1990). 
15 Gaspar and Smets (2000) present some simulations illustrating the relevance of this argument.   15
price level stability can be interpreted as a commitment device.
16 In “Why Price 
Stability?”
17 Issing states “that the question of whether to focus on the price level or 
the inflation rate remains an open issue”.  
 
After more than five years and given the results reviewed above, our third question to 
Otmar Issing is
18: Is time now ripe to consider again the costs and benefits of 
stabilizing the path for the level of prices (rather than the inflation rate)? Why not 
price level stability?  
 
 
3.  Monetary and Financial Analysis 
 
While the baseline model succeeds, albeit under duress, in delivering Issing’s three 
principles, we argue in the remainder of the paper that it ignores monetary and 
financial analysis that plays an important role in ECB’s decision-making.   The easiest 
way to see the omission is to study Chart 4, which shows the ECB’s description of the 
monetary transmission mechanism.
19  The logic of the New Keynesian model can be 
traced through the left hand side of the Chart, which shows the link between the 
official interest rate, expectations and prices.  The Chart, however, also shows that 
policy is believed to operate by affecting bank and market rates, which independently 
are thought to influence prices.    
 
Modeling the transmission mechanism using a single interest rate has a long tradition 
in macroeconomics (e.g. in the IS/LM model).  Bernanke and Blinder (1988) argued 
that the IS/LM model could be usefully extended by allowing for a second interest 
rate.  The argument that follows makes the same point in the context of the New 
Keynesian model.  More specifically, we argue that a second interest rate is also 
necessary to capture Wicksell’s view of the economy. We start the discussion by 
reviewing a few key episodes that are odds with the baseline model and then discuss 
extensions necessary to understand the observed ECB practice.  
 
We find it useful to consider three episodes where monetary and financial conditions 
drove monetary policy decisions and actions. To be concrete, we briefly review the 
ECB’s actions related to the asset market turbulence in the Fall of 1998 and 
September 2001, as well as the words used to discuss possible asset market bubbles.  
 
In the second half of 1998, just at the ECB was preparing for the launch of the 
common monetary policy, the international financial system was hit with a series of 
shocks.  First, on August 17
th the Russian Government devalued the ruble, defaulted 
on its domestic debt and declared a moratorium on its payment to foreign creditors 
(see Chiodo and Owyang (2002) for a summary of the events).   
 
The losses on the bonds destroyed the capital of the Long-Term Capital Management 
(LTCM) hedge fund.  LTCM was a hugely levered entity and it began looking for 
                                                 
16 See Vestin (2006). 
17 Issing (2001b) 
18 See Dugay (1994) for an early survey of the issues raised by price level targeting as an alternative to 
inflation targeting. 
19 See ECB, 2004, Chart 3.1. The ECB’s account of the monetary transmission mechanism and its 
empirical features in the euro area are presented in section 3.2., pages 45-49.   16
additional financing.  By mid-September it became clear that LTCM was at risk for 




“It was the judgment of officials at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, who were 
monitoring the situation on an ongoing basis, that the act of unwinding LTCM's 
portfolio in a forced liquidation would not only have a significant distorting impact on 
market prices but also in the process could produce large losses, or worse, for a 
number of creditors and counterparties, and for other market participants who were 
not directly involved with LTCM. … 
 
Financial market participants were already unsettled by recent global events. Had the 
failure of LTCM triggered the seizing up of markets, substantial damage could have 
been inflicted on many market participants, including some not directly involved with 
the firm, and could have potentially impaired the economies of many nations, 
including our own.” 
 
On this logic the Federal Reserve Bank of New York helped organize a rescue of 
LTCM.  Nonetheless, spreads on corporate securities relative to government securities 
widened and many firms were unable to roll-over their commercial paper when it 
came due.   
 
At the September 29
th FOMC meeting, the Federal Reserve cut the Federal Funds rate 
25 basis points, from to 5.5 to 5.25.  Donald Kohn (who was then a staff member) 
summarized the case for the cut as follows:
21 
 
“The case for easing does not rest on incoming data about the economy.  As many of 
you have noted, the information that has come available since your last meeting 
indicates that the economy continues to expand at a pace around the growth rate of 
potential.   That has kept the unemployment rate flat at a very low level and inflation 
has edged higher on a twelve month basis, at least as measured by the core CPI.  
Thus, a standard, backward-looking Taylor rule that called for a 5.5 percent funds rate 
in August would continue to do so today.  
 
Rather, the case for easing relies on projections that have been marked down by 
developments overseas and in U.S. financial markets.”   
 
The Federal Reserve went on to cut interest rates two more times. In each case the 
FOMC pointed to conditions in financial markets (and not any direct evidence of 
weakness in spending) as the rationale for the moves.  
 
The ECB’s Governing Council also decided in November that a coordinated interest 
rate cut by the National Central Banks was in order.  Thus, on December 3 1998, there 
was a concerted reduction of official interest rates to 3 per cent. The move represented 
the final convergence of interest rates in preparation to the start of the single monetary 
policy. Remarkably, the average three month interbank rate declined, in the countries 
                                                 
20 Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan, “Private-sector refinancing of the large hedge fund, Long-
Term Capital Management” Before the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House of 
Representatives October 1, 1998 
21 FOMC transcripts for the September 29, 1998 meeting, page 77.   17
participating in the euro area, by about 70 basis points between August 1998 and the 
end of the year.  Half of the adjustment took place following the decision of 3 
December. Issing et al. (2001) explain the rationale for these moves on two grounds: 
First, weakness as recorded by leading indicators. Second, turmoil in international 
markets and negative wealth effects associated with stock market losses. These 
together with low inflation and inflation prospects implied that risks to price stability 
were moving to the downside. 
 
The decisions taken by the ECB in the wake of the terrorist attacks against the United 
States on September 11, 2001 provide unambiguous evidence that the ECB acts as if 
shocks to the financial system can be important for monetary policy.  In this case the 
ECB announced on that day that “the Eurosystem stands ready to support the normal 
functioning of markets.  In particular, the Eurosystem will provide liquidity to the 
markets, if need be.”  It re-iterated this pledge the next day and conducted a “liquidity 
providing fine-tuning operation.”  On September 13, it reconfirmed the commitment 
to support the functioning of markets and repeated the liquidity providing fine-tuning 
operation.  It also announced that it had opened a $50 billion swap line with the 
Federal Reserve to “facilitate the functioning of financial markets and provide 
liquidity in dollars.”  On September 17, the bank cut the policy rate by 50 basis points.   
Thus, this is a case where the ECB perceived the disorder in financial markets to be 
critically important and was willing to act promptly to restore order. In any case it is 
important to point out that the decision was made easier because, at the same time, 
economic prospects for the euro area were also weakening. 
 
Finally, throughout Issing’s tenure at the ECB, one of the most hotly debated issues 
for both policymakers and academics has been the linkages between asset prices and 
monetary policy.  There seems to be little dispute that a sharp decline in asset prices 
can be disruptive.  For instance, there is broad consensus that the decade-long slump 
in Japan was triggered by a collapse in asset prices and then prolonged by spillover 
effects of the collapse into the banking system (IMF (2002)).   There is also broad 
agreement that failure to deal decisively with financial system weakness was a major 
policy mistake (Bernanke (2000), Kohn (2006)).  But, the question of what do when 
faced with a large increase in either equity prices or house prices remains 
contentious.
22   
 
Issing (2003a) offers a nuanced view on how to deal with this.  On the one hand he 
notes, “it is worth stressing that according to the previous arguments considering 
financial imbalances - from time to time - may lead to a different monetary policy 
stance than fixed-horizon inflation targeting, despite the fact that the only objective of 
the central bank is price stability (defined over the appropriate medium term 
horizon).”  Yet on the other hand, if one does not adhere rigidly to the fixed-horizon 
then provided that “the central bank employs a medium term horizon for the definition 
of price stability and implies a strategy encompassing a stability-oriented, forward-
looking approach, financial imbalances will implicitly obtain the attention they 
deserve.”   
 
                                                 
22 Issing’s view on this (Issing (20003b) and Issing (2002)), which we agree with, is that pre-emptive 
policy moves based purely elevated asset values would be dangerous.      
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Our fourth question to Issing is thus: some proponents of inflation targeting 
recommend focusing on an inflation forecast at a fixed time-horizon (say two years). 
Many times you have suggested that a flexible time frame, and sometimes a long time 
frame, maybe be necessary to cope with some shocks and risks. What are the most 
important considerations determining the length of the relevant time horizon? How 
can such considerations be most effectively communicated?  Does the unwillingness 
to commit to a fixed time horizon create temptation that can undermine credibility?  
 
Can the baseline new Keynesian model account for the right-hand side of Chart 4?  
 
Up to this point we intentionally abstracted from the mechanism by which monetary 
policy affects the output gap.  To determine whether we can reconcile the baseline 
model with the aforementioned concerns regarding the financial system we must 
explore these connections more thoroughly. In Woodford (2003, chapter 4) this 
connection is precisely derived.  In particular, he shows that  
 
(8)  ( ) 11 tt t t t t t x Ex E v ηα ρ π ++ =+ −+  
 
where  ρ is the interest rate that is relevant for spending decisions and v is the 
aggregate demand shock.   
 
One of the points of Woodford (2003) is that equation (8) is consistent with 
Wicksell’s view of the economy.  We agree with this, although Wicksell himself 
presumed that a “loan” rate was the relevant one for spending and so in deference to 
Wicksell we will refer to ρ as a loan rate.  As we explain below, ρ could also be 
interpreted as the required return on equity or the corporate bond rate.  
 
In contrast to the Wicksellian approach, the convention in the recent literature is to 
equate ρ with the policy rate. We believe the distinction between treating ρ as being 
perfectly and imperfectly linked to the policy rate is critical and that an extended 
model that presumes an imperfect connection generates several interesting insights.   
 
One reason for considering an imperfect connection is that no users of this model 
believe that the short-term interest rate is the critical interest rate for spending.   
Instead one presumably equates ρ with the policy rate because the appropriate longer 
term interest rate that belongs in (8) is itself a stable function of the policy rate; the 
expectations hypothesis of term-structure determination might justify this 
simplification if there were no time-variation in any term-premia.  Cochrane and 
Piazzesi (2005), and many others document the considerable time-variation in term-
premia.  More importantly, the Fall 1998 and September 2001 episodes specifically 
suggest that policymakers are sometimes quite concerned about such variation.   
Indeed, Chart 4 shows that the ECB believes that it is crucial to monitor developments 
regarding the connections between the policy rate and market rates (and asset 
prices).
23   
 
                                                 
23 See ECB (2004) pages 44-49.   19
Accordingly, in the remainder of the paper we explore the consequences of 
introducing a distinction between the policy rate and the loan rate.
24  Specifically, we 
assume  
 
(9)   tt t      +  (i ,  )i  + z tt t t t x ρ ςδ ε =  , 
 
where i denotes the policy rate and ε a stochastic disturbance affecting the monetary 
transmission mechanism.   
 
This formulation is admittedly ad-hoc and we make no attempt to provide micro 
foundations that deliver this precise equation.  Instead, we view it as a relatively 
general specification that allows us to nest various hypotheses that have been put 
forward about the workings of financial markets.  For instance, one way to think of 
(9) is as of a description of the equilibrium in loan market.  Naturally, loan rates 
would rise when output is abnormally high – more generally we allow ρ to depend on 
x to capture the effects of the demand for credit on the price of credit. Likewise, when 
the policy rate increases, loan rates tend to rise; in general arbitrage considerations 
would require expected rates of returns on other securities to rise when the rate of 
return on the safe asset increases.   
 
We allow for time variation in δ, the function governing the link between the policy 
rate and the loan rate, because of the evolving nature of intermediation (that we 
discuss further below).  Under this interpretation, ε would be a vector of factors that 
also affect the loan rate, such as the amount of capital in the banking system or the 
net-worth of borrowers.  Finally, we allow for a disturbance z in the loan market that 
we also discuss shortly.   
 
Substituting this back into the output gap equation yields the following: 
 
(10)  ( ) 1t t 1 (1 ) (i , )i tt t t t t t t t t x Ex z E v ας η α δ ε π ++ −= + + −+    
 
The usual special case considered by Woodford and most others in the literature 
presumes that δ and ς are known multipliers and z is zero.  We see three reasons for 
generalizing in this way.  First, we believe it allows us to formalize the concerns 
raised by Wicksell and others. Using Wicksell’s framework it is natural to think about 
two wedges: first the wedge between the loan rate and the Wicksellian natural rate 
(the difference putting the “cumulative process” in motion) and second, the wedge 
between the loan rate and the policy rate. Second, it provides a convenient way to 
formalize a great deal of empirical evidence, including the large project on the 
monetary transmission that Issing initiated.  Finally, it helps explain some aspects of 
the monetary policy strategy that has been practiced by the ECB. From this viewpoint, 
                                                 
24 The alternative approach would be allow financial factors to matter, but to assume that this reflects 
un-modeled factors that affect desired spending; this amounts to assuming in (8) that v and not ρ is the 
relevant channel through which financial factors matter.  It is possible that some cases, such as a 
decline in asset prices that reduce wealth, might naturally correspond to this interpretation.  But, in 
other cases this assignment is less clear. For instance, the widening spreads on corporate bonds and 
commercial paper in the Fall of 1998 most naturally would be interpreted as raising the cost of capital 
for firms.  Depending on whether there is any credit-rationing this type of shock might or might not 
belong in the residual in (8).  Undoubtedly, the change in the spreads should appear in ρ.   20
the loan rate is a summary of all the variables determining the financing conditions in 
the economy (as in ECB (2004)).    
 
Taking (10) together with the Phillip’s curve and a monetary policy rule allows us 
derive several propositions about the role of monetary and financial analysis in the 
conduct of monetary policy.   
 
First, in the usual special case considered in the literature, the fact that spending 
depends on a loan rate and only indirectly on the policy rate would be inconsequential 
for the monetary authority.  The policymakers would have to recognize that the 
coefficients on output and the policy rate in the aggregate demand equations are 
reduced form coefficients, but they would be stable reduced form coefficients.   
 
Second, if zt is random and α is known certainty equivalence results apply.  So this 
particular type of the uncertainty would have little practical impact on the central 
bank’s conduct.   
 
Alternatively, if relevant parameters are both unknown and time-varying then the 
central bank’s job becomes much harder. The literature does not seem to provide any 
general insights.  In cases where uncertainty is primarily about the static effect of the 
policy instrument on spending, then the problem looks much like the one studied by 
Brainard (1967) and the associated reasoning suggests that the policy-maker will 
behave cautiously (meaning he should move less than implied by certainty 
equivalence). On the other hand, if the uncertainty relates to the dynamic effects of 
policy, and the dynamics of the system threaten to become unhinged, then the central 
bank should be extra aggressive in responding to shocks, thereby stabilizing inflation.   
 
As signaled by the quote from Issing at the start of this paper, he struggled with how 
to handle uncertainty throughout his career as a central banker.  One further indication 
of the importance he placed on this problem is that he sponsored two major 
international conferences (in 1999 and 2004) on this theme of how to operate given 
uncertainty and imperfect knowledge.   
 
He also supported a cooperative venture between the ECB and the National Central 
Banks of the Eurosystem to study the monetary transmission from a variety of angles.  
The Monetary Transmission Network (MTN) research offers the most complete 
assessment to date of how monetary policy appears to operate in the euro area.  
 
It is particularly relevant, in the context of Chart 4, that much of the MTN research 
was aimed at studying the importance of shifts in bank loan supply in the transmission 
of monetary policy. Operationally this amounted to comparing changes in loan 
volumes for different types of banks (small versus large, liquid versus illiquid, 
members of groups versus independent, etc) following changes in policy rates.  In 
terms of (9) these different bank characteristics would be candidates for ε.  There was 
no single contrast the revealed systematic differences in all countries, although in 
nearly all cases it appears that banks with fewer liquid assets on their balance sheets 
seem to cut lending relatively more when policy rates rise.  Thus, at an aggregate level 
the amount (and distribution of) liquidity in the banking system is one candidate 
proxy for ε that deserves more scrutiny.  Interestingly, neither the level of bank   21
capital, nor the size of a bank seemed to be closely related to the degree to which bank 
lending changes.   
 
The MTN and a number of follow up studies at the ECB and elsewhere in the 
Eurosystem have also explored the role of the “financial accelerator” in influencing 
investment (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999)).  Broadly these studies tend to 
find clear evidence that financial factors tend to amplify changes triggered by changes 
in policy rates.  The MTN evidence suggests that firm size typically does not govern 
the importance of these effects, but there are many predictable differences as to which 
types of firms respond more or less strongly to changes in interest rates.     
 
There has been less research to date on the role of non-bank financing (and more 
precisely disturbances to this type of financing) in affecting spending.  But, there is a 
great deal of indirect evidence suggesting that these disturbances could be important.   
For instance, there is a large literature that studies the predictive power of yield 
spreads for many macroeconomic variables.  Moneta (2005) shows that in the euro 
area the spread between the ten-year government bond rate and the three month 
interbank rate is a good predictor of recessions.  Importantly, his regressions show 
that this spread has out of sample forecasting ability, that the spread adds information 
over and above the information past data on recessions, and that the spread  is a more 
informative forecasting variable than GDP, stock prices and a composite index of 
leading indicators.   This could be accounted for in our framework assuming that ρ 
should be a long-term interest rate and by associating z with the term premia.  
 
Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2005) estimate a small dynamic, stochastic general 
equilibrium model of the euro area economy that allows for 14 different disturbances.  
They find that when they suppress financial shocks the model predicts that output 
volatility would drop substantially (by more than half using their baseline 
estimates).
25  Thus they conclude that further modeling of the financial system is 
critically important for understanding euro area business cycle dynamics.  
 
In the current version of their model, shocks to the net worth of entrepreneurs are the 
critical financial disturbances. This could captured in (9) by posting that household 
net worth belongs in ε or that the residual, z, might be related to net worth. The 
conjecture that these shocks could be important is also consistent with the findings by 
Adalid and Detken (2006) that loose money, associated with excessive growth in 
monetary aggregates, is related to asset price increases and that these increases lead to 
spending increases (and ultimately recessions).  
 
Thus, a third general proposition about (10) is that there are many routes by which a 
change in the policy rate might be amplified or dampened due to financial factors.  
The ECB’s monitoring and cross-checking seeks to identify these cases.   
 
Such considerations lead to our fifth question to Issing: how best to characterize the 
various channels of the monetary transmission mechanism in a theory of monetary 
policy? Specifically, what monetary and financial shocks are likely to be most 
relevant?  What remain as the least certain features of the transmission mechanism? 
                                                 
25 Dynan, Elmendorf and Sichel (2006) assemble a variety of evidence that suggests that changes in the 
structure of financial markets have contributed to the decline in volatility of real activity in the United 
States.   22
 
One last issue concerns the role of monetary aggregates. Patinkin (1965, 1968) and 
Humphrey (1997) convincingly show that Wicksell was a main upholder of the 
quantity theory of money. For example, in Wicksell’s cumulative process monetary 
expansion (contraction) is crucial to accommodate the increase (decline) in prices 
occurring when the loan rate is below (above) the natural rate. In his Lectures on 
Political Economy he devotes 50 pages refuting the critics of the classical quantity 
theory of money. Wicksell (like Fisher) uses the quantity theory to argue that 
monetary policy can only bear responsibility for the determination of the value of 
some nominal variable (e.g. the price level). Nevertheless, in our simplified account 
of the Wicksellian loan rate and our discussion on the implications for the conduct of 
monetary policy, the explicit role of monetary aggregates has been very limited.  
 
Others have argued for a more central role for monetary aggregates. For example 
Christiano and Rostagno (2001) argue that monitoring money allows for 
improvements on the outcomes implied by a Taylor rule, while Nelson (2003) 
(following a tradition that prominently includes Brunner and Meltzer) states that 
monetary aggregates may serve as proxy for the substitution effects of monetary 
policy in an environment where the multiplicity of financial assets matters.  
 
This leads us to our last question to Issing: Is our reading of Wicksell in error? If so, is 
there a modification of the model in section 3 (or a completely different model) that 
would make the role of money explicit?  Put differently, can we move past the 
quantity theory to use monetary aggregates more productively in the policy process?   23
 
4.  Conclusion. 
 
In this paper, we review Otmar Issing’s career as the ECB’s inaugural chief 
economist. We began by documenting many notable successes including: 1) the 
seamless transition to the single monetary policy; 2) the maintenance of price stability 
over the medium term; 3) low and stable inflation expectations; 4) reduced volatility 
of key economic variables. 
 
 We argue that the standard New Keynesian model, which is widely used in the theory 
of monetary policy, is able to account for many features that characterize Otmar 
Issing’s approach to the conduct of monetary policy. In particular, it seems to account 
for Issing’s three guiding principles for the successful conduct of monetary policy, 
namely: 1) Institutions matter. Theoretical reasoning and historical experience show 
that price stability and central banking independence are the two defining features of 
sound institutional arrangements. 2) Credibility is fundamental. It is necessary to 
ensure price stability in a way that is compatible with an overall environment of 
macroeconomic stability. 3)  Temptation must be resisted. In particular, never take 
credibility for granted, be constantly vigilant and beware of the lasting costs of policy 
mistakes.  
 
Thirty years ago, Charles Goodhart (1981, page 116) formulated is famous law “that 
any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is put upon it for 
control purposes.” Issing examined Goodhart’s law (in Issing, 1997) and interpreted it 
as a particular case of the Lucas (1976) critique. Goodhart’s law was inspired by the 
historical example of change and instability of monetary policy in the UK. Thus, 
Issing decided, inspired by the experience of the Bundesbank, to spin the Lucas 
critique in the opposite direction. Our favorite formulation of Issing’s law
26 is: “a 
policy (...) geared to steadiness and medium-term objectives reinforces ... stability ... 
and hence the foundation of the policy itself.” Goodhart’s law stresses a vicious circle 
of instability generating instability. Issing’s law, instead, stresses the virtuous circle of 
stability begetting stability. Thus one of our major conclusions is that the success of 
the ECB illustrates the practical relevance of Issing’s law. 
 
Our second major conclusion is that the link between theory and the practice of 
monetary policy, at the ECB, under Issing, is the least clear concerning the role of 
monetary and financial analysis.  Our assessment is that this mostly reflects the 
limited attention that financial factors have received in the theoretical models.   We 
proposed one extension that moves towards filling this gap.  While we find the 
extended model helpful for organizing many observations about practice, we 
recognize that the lack of foundations to our model is a serious short-coming.  We 
hope that by calling attention to this disconnect between the theory and practice we 
can trigger more research to close this gap.   
 
Finally, we see the comparison of the theory and practice as raising many questions. 
We hope, as a parting gift, Issing, in due course, will share his thoughts on these 
specific questions.   
                                                 
26 In Issing (1997) the reference is clearly to the monetary targeting strategy of the Bundesbank. We 
have omitted these references in order to highlight the general relevance of Issing’s law.   24
  
First, given the fact the monetary, economic and political trends are co-determined 
and co-evolutionary what is the ground for optimism about the future of the European 
Union?  How will political forces affect the operation of the European Central Bank 
and the Eurosystem? 
 
Second, as a practical matter, what are the most likely threats to the credibility of the 
European Central Bank? Which temptations are hardest to resist, what mistakes are 
easiest to make? How important is communication with the European people as 
prevention against such possibilities? 
 
Third, is time now ripe to consider again the costs and benefits of stabilizing the path 
for the level of prices (rather than the inflation rate)? Why not price level stability?  
 
Fourth, what are the most important considerations determining the length of the 
relevant time horizon? How can such considerations be most effectively 
communicated?  Does the unwillingness to commit to a fixed time horizon create 
temptation that can undermine credibility?  
 
Fifth, how best to characterize the various channels of the monetary transmission 
mechanism in a theory of monetary policy? Specifically, what monetary and financial 
shocks are likely to be most relevant?  What remain as the least certain features of the 
transmission mechanism? 
 
Sixth, is our reading of Wicksell is in error?  If so, is there a modification of the 
model in section 3 (or a completely different model) that would make the role of 
money explicit? Put differently, can we move past the quantity theory to use monetary 
aggregates more productively in the policy process? 
 
Issing’s awareness of the key importance of uncertainty, imperfect knowledge and 
communication has been, in our view, crucial to his success. As in the concluding 
quote from Machiavelli, Issing benefited from good fortune: 
 
“(…) anybody wise enough to understand the times and the types of affairs and to 
adapt himself to them would have always good fortune (…) and it would come to be 
true that the wise man would rule the stars and the Fates.” 
 
Niccolò Machiavelli, January 1513, letter to Piero Soderini in Ragusa, in Allan 
Gilbert, The Letters of Machiavelli, University of Chicago Press, 1988. 
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Chart 4: The ECB’s Stylized Depiction of the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
 
 
 
 
 